

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 07664

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PARM  
SUBJECT: MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF MAY 17, 1978  
(SALT TWO--1751)

SEMENOV STATEMENT, MAY 17, 1978

- I  
REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT OF  
THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR  
SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC  
OFFENSIVE ARMS IS A SPECIFIC TASK WHICH WAS ASSIGNED TO  
THE DELEGATIONS IN THE SPIRIT OF THE RECENT EXCHANGE OF  
VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION AT A DIFFERENT LEVEL IN MOSCOW.  
AND THIS IS NOT ACCIDENTAL. THE JOINT STATEMENT IS OF  
VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE IN TERMS OF ENSURING THE CONTINUITY  
AND CONSISTENCY OF THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE SIDES IN  
LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN THE INTERESTS OF  
REDUCING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR AND  
STRENGTHENING PEACE.

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AS A RESULT OF THE DISCUSSIONS HELD, ON MANY OF THE  
PROVISIONS OF THE JOINT STATEMENT A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE  
OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OR PROXIMITY OF VIEWS HAS BEEN  
ACHIEVED, AS REFLECTED IN THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT AS OF  
APRIL 14, 1978. THE PREAMBLE IS AGREED. BASICALLY, THE  
FIRST, SECOND AND FOURTH SECTIONS ARE ALSO AGREED. THERE  
ARE CLOSE OR COINCIDING PROVISIONS IN THE THIRD SECTION.

IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW THE SIDES ARRIVED AT A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SECTION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT WHERE DIFFERENCES REMAIN BE FORMULATED IN BROAD AND GENERAL TERMS. THE DELEGATIONS MUST NOW CONTINUE THIS WORK IN ORDER TO COMPLETE WORKING OUT THE JOINT STATEMENT AT AN EARLY DATE.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE AGREED PREMISE THAT THE JOINT STATEMENT, IN ESTABLISHING THE PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS, MUST NOT PREDETERMINE THE SPECIFIC RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE RELEVANT ISSUES AT SALT THREE. IT IS ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS EACH SIDE WILL BE FREE TO RAISE ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

TAKING THIS INTO ACCOUNT, THE USSR DELEGATION IS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO PROPOSE THAT THE THIRD SECTION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT BE AGREED UPON IN THE FOLLOWING WORDING:

"THIRD. IN THE COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS THE PARTIES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL RELEVANT FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, WILL SEEK TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS,  
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INCLUDING REDUCTION OF THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THESE FACTORS, THE PARTIES WILL ALSO SEEK TO ACHIEVE QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, INCLUDING LIMITATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES AND SYSTEMS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND ON MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFOREMENTIONED PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES, THE PARTIES WILL SEEK TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES INCLUDED IN THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS."

PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS, THE USSR DELEGATION ALSO PROPOSES THAT THE FOURTH SECTION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT BE WORDED AS FOLLOWS:

"FOURTH. THE PARTIES WILL CONSIDER OTHER STEPS TO ENSURE AND ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY, TO ENSURE THE

EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY OF THE PARTIES, AND TO IMPLEMENT THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES. IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, EACH PARTY WILL BE FREE TO RAISE ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE PARTIES WILL ALSO CONSIDER FURTHER JOINT MEASURES, AS APPROPRIATE, TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND TO REDUCE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR."

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DRAFT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT. THE AGREED TEXT CONTAINS A PROVISION ON SEEKING MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN STRATEGIC STABILITY BY, INTER ALIA, LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MOST DESTABILIZING TO THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. THE BRACKETED WORDS ARE DESIGNED TO ACCOMMODATE A ONE-SIDED CONCEPT AT THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THEY MUST BE REMOVED.

CONCERNING THE SECOND SECTION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT BOTH NOW AND IN THE FUTURE UNDERSTANDINGS CONCERNING MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE APPROPRIATELY VERIFIED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THIS IS WHAT MUST BE CONSISTENTLY EMBODIED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL. A FORMULATION WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF

VERIFICATION BY MEASURES OTHER THAN NATIONAL TECHNICAL  
MEANS IS CONTRARY TO THE AFOREMENTIONED FUNDAMENTAL  
PRINCIPLE AND THEREFORE MUST BE REMOVED.

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THE AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE SECOND SECTION FULLY  
EXPRESS THEIR INTENDED CONTENT, AMONG OTHER THINGS WITH  
RESPECT TO TAKING, AS APPROPRIATE, COOPERATIVE MEASURES  
CONTRIBUTING TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF VERIFICATION BY  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

TAKEN TOGETHER, THE NEW PROPOSALS SET FORTH PROVIDE  
A SOLUTION TO THE RELEVANT QUESTIONS.

THE USSR DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT ON THE BASIS OF  
ALREADY AGREED PROVISIONS AND ON THE BASIS OF THE  
FORMULATIONS TABLED TODAY FINAL AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED  
ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DRAFT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT.

- II

MR. AMBASSADOR,

AS NOTED IN THE USSR DELEGATION'S STATEMENT AT THE  
APRIL 12, 1978 MEETING, AS A RESULT OF THE EXCHANGE OF  
VIEWS HELD, CERTAIN PROGRESS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED TOWARD  
AGREEING UPON THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XVI OF THE DRAFT  
TREATY--ON ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED ICBM LAUNCHES.

WE ARE CLOSE ON THE CONTENT OF THE WORDING OF  
PARAGRAPH 1 OF THIS ARTICLE.

A COMMON UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN AGREED UPON, TO THE  
EFFECT THAT ICBM LAUNCHES TO WHICH THE OBLIGATIONS  
PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE XVI APPLY, INCLUDE, AMONG OTHERS,  
THOSE ICBM LAUNCHES FOR WHICH ADVANCE NOTIFICATION IS  
REQUIRED PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE RELEVANT  
AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. IN 1971

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AND 1972. -- ,"

A COMMON UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE TEST RANGES  
REFERRED TO IN THIS ARTICLE HAS ALSO BEEN AGREED UPON.

THE SIDES ARE ALSO IN AGREEMENT ON THE WORDING OF

ARTICLE XVI, PAR. 2--ON REACHING AGREEMENT IN THE STANDING  
CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION UPON THE PROCEDURES TO IMPLEMENT  
THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT  
NOTIFICATIONS OF PLANNED ICBM LAUNCHES CONDUCTED WITHIN  
NATIONAL TERRITORY COULD BE PROVIDED BY THE SIDE CARRYING  
OUT SUCH LAUNCHES WHEN, IN ITS VIEW, SUCH LAUNCHES MIGHT  
BE MISINTERPRETED AND GIVE RISE TO CONCERN OF THE OTHER  
SIDE.

IN THE INTERESTS OF CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRESS TOWARD  
REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT TREATY,  
AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE INTEREST IN THIS QUESTION  
DISPLAYED BY THE U.S. SIDE, THE SOVIET UNION HAS PROPOSED  
THAT THE SIDES NOTIFY EACH OTHER OF ALL PLANNED ICBM  
LAUNCHES CONDUCTED WITHIN NATIONAL TERRITORY, EXCEPT FOR  
SINGLE ICBM LAUNCHES OF THIS KIND. THIS IS THE FIRM  
POSITION OF THE SOVIET SIDE.

ACCORDINGLY, AT THE APRIL 12, 1978 MEETING THE USSR  
DELEGATION TABLED NEW WORDING FOR ARTICLE XVI, PAR. 1, OF  
THE DRAFT, AS WELL AS A COMMON UNDERSTANDING TO THAT  
ARTICLE, WHICH DRAWS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN A SINGLE AND A  
MULTIPLE ICBM LAUNCH WITHIN NATIONAL TERRITORY. ACCORDING  
TO THE UNDERSTANDING WE HAVE PROPOSED A MULTIPLE LAUNCH  
IS A LAUNCH OF TWO OR MORE ICBMS FROM ONE TEST RANGE OR  
FROM ONE ICBM LAUNCHER DEPLOYMENT AREA WITHIN NO MORE  
THAN 10 MINUTES.

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SIDE IS QUITE SUFFICIENT FOR DETERMINING THAT A GIVEN LAUNCH IS CONDUCTED PRECISELY WITHIN NATIONAL TERRITORY.

ALSO TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT TREATY'S ARTICLE XVI ITSELF, WITH RESPECT TO LAUNCHES CONDUCTED WITHIN NATIONAL TERRITORY, WILL AFFECT ONLY THE USSR, THE PROPOSALS WE TABLED ON APRIL 12, 1978 CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS CONSTRUCTIVE STEP BY THE SOVIET SIDE, AIMED AT REACHING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON THE ASPECT UNDER DISCUSSION.

AS FOR THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED HERE CONCERNING AN INTERVAL OF A ONE-HOUR DURATION, SUCH A TIME PERIOD IS IN ESSENCE ARBITRARY, AND IS NOT MANDATED BY THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED IN ARTICLE XVI OF THE TREATY. THIS CANNOT SERVE AS A BASIS FOR AGREEMENT.

THE USSR DELEGATION PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE CONSIDERATIONS SET FORTH WILL MEET WITH CAREFUL AND SECRET

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CONSTRUCTIVE UNDERSTANDING, IN THE INTERESTS OF REACHING FINAL AGREEMENT ON ARTICLE XVI OF THE DRAFT TREATY.

- III

IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING DISCUSSIONS THE U.S. SIDE HAS RAISED A QUESTION REGARDING 18 ICBM LAUNCHERS AT THE TYURA-TAM TEST RANGE.

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS TO STATE THAT THESE 18 ICBM LAUNCHERS AT THE TYURA-TAM TEST RANGE ARE LAUNCHERS DEVELOPED FOR TESTING AND TRAINING, AND THAT THE SOVIET SIDE DOES NOT INTEND TO USE THEM FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

I ALSO HAVE TO CLARIFY THAT THESE LAUNCHERS WERE INTENDED FOR DEVELOPMENT OF FRACTIONAL ORBITAL MISSILES, AND THAT IN THE EVENT THE AGREEMENT IS CONCLUDED, SUCH MISSILES WILL BE DESTROYED AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY.

I WOULD RECALL THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IX, SUBPAR. (C), WHICH ARE AGREED, EACH SIDE UNDERTAKES NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY SYSTEMS FOR PLACING INTO EARTH ORBIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ANY OTHER KIND OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, INCLUDING FRACTIONAL ORBI-

TAL MISSILES. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING TO THIS SUBPARAGRAPH, ALSO AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF ANY EXISTING LAUNCHERS OF EITHER SIDE IS NOT REQUIRED.

NATURALLY, THESE 18 ICBM LAUNCHERS AT THE TYURA-TAM TEST RANGE, HAVING BEEN DEVELOPED FOR TESTING AND TRAINING, ARE NOT SUBJECT TO BEING COUNTED WITHIN THE MAXIMUM  
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AGGREGATES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BEING ESTABLISHED IN THE TREATY.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THIS EXHAUSTS THE ENTIRE QUESTION. EARLE

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## Message Attributes

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